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Introduction
1    
The British banking system emerged from the First World War with a 
degree of centralisation unprecedented among major industrial nations. Five 
major clearing banks formed a collusive oligopoly that constituted one of the 
most powerful and enduring monopoly positions in any major British industry. 
Such concentration had potentially far-reaching consequences for British 
economic development, as banks constitute the main intermediaries between 
domestic savers and non-mortgage borrowers.  
Neoclassical economic theory indicates that monopolists will impose 
welfare losses on society, as profit-maximisation produces a lower output and 
higher profits compared with perfect competition. Excluded customers may be 
substantial in volume and would be worthy of finance in a competitive market, 
but will be those who represent, or (given imperfect information) are 
considered to be, the least profitable business. This, in turn, will discourage 
new competitors in situations where first mover advantages would make it 
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  1difficult for entrants to compete for the monopolist’s existing customers.  
The welfare losses from monopoly might be offset by increases in technical 
efficiency due to increased scale. However, empirical research for post-1945 
Britain has generally corroborated the existence of substantial welfare losses, 
while finding little evidence that these were offset by technical gains. While 
some studies found that monopoly positions were gradually eroded, this was 
shown to typically be a very long and slow process.
2  
Recent analysis of banking profitability lends support for the 
hypothesis that the banks reaped monopoly profits. True interwar banking 
profits were found to be both substantially greater than published figures and - 
particularly during the 1920s - to have compared well even with British 
manufacturing (which was regarded as being of substantially higher risk - as 
evidenced by the lower risk premium attached to banking shares and their 
purchase by institutions that would not consider even large manufacturers).
3 
                         
2 See, for example, G. Walshe, Recent Trends in Monopoly in Great Britain, NIESR 
Occasional Paper XXVII  (Cambridge: CUP, 1974); M.A. Utton, Profits and Stability of 
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3 Forrest Capie and Mark Billings, “Profitability in English banking in the twentieth century”, 
European Review of Economic History, 5 (2001): 367-401, Figure 11. For investors’ 
perceptions of banking and industrial shares, see Peter Scott, “Towards the ‘Cult of the 
Equity’? Insurance companies and the interwar capital market,” Economic History Review, 
  2The clearing banks have also come in for unfavourable comparison to their 
continental rivals - with regard to their domestic developmental role – one 
strand of a broader ‘City/industry’ critique of the internal economic 
consequences of Britain’s metropolitan and externally-orientated financial 
system.
4 Conversely, banking historians have often been sceptical regarding 
whether Britain’s concentrated interwar banking structure significantly 
reduced the volume of industrial lending, even with respect to small firms.
5 
Indeed Ross even goes so far as to argue that the banking market was efficient 
and that excluded borrowers were limited to those not worthy of finance at the 
competitive market equilibrium.
6 Elsewhere, he notes that banks may have 
acted as discriminating monopolists, but argues that this would again have left 
only charlatans and very marginal cases for new entrants.
7
                                                      
LV (2002): 78-104, 90.  
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(Oxford: Clarendon, 1986); Francesca Carnevali, Europe’s Advantage. Banks and Small Firms 
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5 See, for example, Mae Baker and Michael Collins, “The durability of transaction banking 
practices in the provision of finance to the business sector by British banks”, Entreprises et 
Histiore, 1999, No. 22: 78-92, 79-80. 
6 Duncan M. Ross, “The ‘Macmillan gap’ and the British credit market in the 1930s”, 209-26 in P. 
L. Cottrell, A. Teichova and T. Yuzawa (eds) Finance in the Age of the Corporate Economy, 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 209-10. ,  
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  3This article re-examines the attitudes of the interwar clearing banks 
regarding lending to firms of insufficient size to raise funds via a public share 
issue (for larger firms the stock market provided an important counter to the 
banks’ monopoly power), particularly for longer-term requirements. Banks 
limited their lending to short-term working capital to a much greater extent 
than their local antecedents (despite firms’ growing requirements for long-
term capital). They aimed to maximise liquidity so as to minimise risk, and 
felt secure in dictating their own terms to industry as, given their tight cartel, 
they faced a largely captive market – at least for companies of insufficient size 
for a public share issue.   
The banks’ restrictive lending criteria became politically controversial 
from the time of the emergence of the ‘Big Five’, as evidenced by the debate 
over the alleged ‘Macmillan gap’ in finance to smaller enterprises.
8 Rejecting 
the existence of any significant Macmillan gap would imply one of three 
hypotheses: that smaller firms had no need for long-term external capital; that 
such capital was already adequately provided by other sources; or that the 
banks already acted as long-term financiers, despite their public and private 
protestations to the contrary.  This last hypothesis has generally been rejected 
by recent research on bank lending, which has found that banks followed their 
own theoretical precepts in confining their activities to the formal provision of 
                                                      
the wars”, Economic History Review, XLIX (No. 2, 1996): 314-35, 329-30. 
8 Committee on Finance and Industry, Report (Cmnd. 3897 of 1931). 
  4short-term loans, for working capital.
9   
Rather than demonstrating that there were either sufficient alternative 
sources of long-term funding, or a lack of industrial demand for such finance, 
banking historians have taken the absence of concrete evidence for a 
substantial group of viable and profitable lending propositions that were not 
adequately served by existing capital market facilities as proof that that no 
significant gap existed.  Yet, As Ziegler has noted, quantitative archival analysis 
of the Macmillan gap is fraught with difficulty.  Bank archives are unlikely to 
provide any real reflection of rejected business, as applications of the type 
deemed unsuitable would be discouraged verbally by local managers (an 
informal screening process); meanwhile industrial archives are heavily biased 
                         
9 Michael Collins and Mae Baker, “British commercial bank support for the business sector and 
the pressure for change, 1918-39”, in Makoto Kasuya (ed), Coping with Crisis. International 
Financial Institutions in the Interwar Period (Oxford, 2003): 43-60; Forrest Capie and Michael 
Collins, “Banks, industry, and finance, 1880-1914”, Business History, 41, (No. 1, 1999): 37-62; 
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“English Commercial Bank Stability, 1860-1914”, The Journal of European Economic History, 
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Industrial Finance in England and Wales, 1860-1913 (Oxford, 2005), 195-200. 
  5towards survival and success.
10 Contemporaries also observed that propositions 
falling outside the banks’ criteria for legitimacy were ‘invisible’ to the system; 
for example O. T. Falk of stockbrokers Buckmaster and Moore stated that, ‘the 
banks as a whole deny the existence of the problem because it is so well known 
that they will not lock up capital that they are not approached by small people 
wanting to start a new business.  Hence they do not come in contact with the 
gap.’
11
Critics of the Macmillan gap have pointed to the limited success of the 
new lending institutions established during the 1930s, ostensibly to breach this 
gap, as proof that there was no un-met demand for finance which could be 
catered for without incurring risks that would “endanger the stability of the 
financial system as a whole.”
12  This paper provides the first detailed 
examination of these new institutions using archival evidence (including 
internal business records, and reports and memoranda to the Bank of England 
and the clearing banks).  This shows that, with the exception of Credit for 
Industry Ltd [CFI] and those organisations limited to severely depressed areas, 
the ‘Macmillan gap’ institutions essentially catered for companies that might 
be suitable for a public share issue within a few years, rather than typical 
                         
10. Dieter Ziegler, “The origins of the "Macmillan gap": comparing Britain and Germany in the 
early twentieth century”, in P. L. Cottrell, A. Teichova and T. Yuzawa (eds.), Finance in the Age 
of the Corporate Economy (Aldershot, 1997), 187-8. 
11 BLPES, AB 352, VI2, OERG, meeting with O. T. Talk, 6 March 1937. 
12 Ross, “The ‘Macmillan Gap’”, 222. 
  6small-medium firms.  Meanwhile CFI’s operations were severely constrained 
by the clearing banks, which undermined its viability by ‘poaching’ clients it 
had vetted and approved. It thus makes an important contribution both to the 
debate regarding the banks’ exercise of monopoly power and their responses 
to market entry – showing that they acted as ‘jealous monopolists’ - frustrating 
officially-sponsored attempts to foster the development of specialist medium-
long term industrial lending institutions. 
  The next section examines the impact of the concentration of English 
and Welsh clearing banks into the London-based Big Five on bank-industry 
relations. In addition to reviewing evidence from other studies, regarding the 
trend towards short-term lending covered by collateral security as 
concentration grew, this section provides new evidence regarding moves 
towards quantitative credit rationing by the clearing banks and shows that the 
big banks demonstrated some reluctance to compete with each other for 
business. Contemporary criticisms of the new banking structure’s impact on 
industrial lending, culminating in definition of the Macmillan gap, are then 
reviewed, together with the response from the banks.  After outlining the Bank 
of England’s initiative to establish a ‘champion’ to breach this gap during the 
1930s, the record of the several institutions that entered this field is assessed. 
 
Bank mergers and the restriction of industrial lending 
  The 1860s witnessed the onset of  a merger movement among clearing 
  7banks in England and Wales,  which intensified from the 1880s.   This 
centralised much banking business into large firms, headquartered from 
London, which serviced the provinces only through their branch networks.  By 
1911 London-based banking groups controlled 56 per cent of UK branches 
and 65 per cent of deposits.
13 The First World War witnessed a renewed burst 
of merger activity, buoyed up by particularly high banking profits.  Banks 
were acquired at very high prices, threatening to seriously dilute the future 
profitability of the sector.  Yet barriers to entry protected the banks from the 
fate that befell many industrial firms who had participated in the war/post-war 
merger mania.  The main barrier was access to the London Clearing House, 
which was tightly restricted and had become essential for large-scale branch 
banking.
14 As Ackerill and Hannah noted, ‘If a tighter banking oligopoly 
could reduce competition and raise sustainable long-run profits, the acquiring 
banks’ shareholders might yet benefit.  Fortunately for them (though arguably 
                         
13 Michael Ball and David Sunderland, An Economic History of London 1800-1914 (London, 
2001), 338-46; Michael Collins, Money and Banking in the UK. A History (London, 1988), 78-9.  
See also F. Capie and G. Rodrik-Bali, “Banking concentration in British Banking, 1870-1920”, 
Business History, 24: 280-92 and Michael Collins and Mae Baker, “Sectoral differences in 
English bank asset structures and the impact of mergers, 1860-1913”, Business History, Vol. 43, 
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14 Forrest Capie and Mark Billings, “Evidence on competition in English commercial banking, 
1920-1970”, Financial History Review, 11 (2004): 69-103, 75. 
  8less happily for the banks’ customers)… this condition was fulfilled’.
15  
  Bank lending had traditionally been short-term, having developed in an 
era when the long-term capital needs of industry were generally modest and 
most businessmen required loans primarily for working capital and cash 
flow.
16  The merger movement and the 1878 City of Glasgow Bank crisis
17 
accentuated this emphasis on liquidity, London-based head offices issuing 
directives for more restrictive lending criteria than their provincial antecedents 
had imposed.
18  Recent examination of bank lending during 1880-1914 has 
                         
15 Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah, Barclays. The Business of Banking 1690-1996 
(Cambridge, 2001), 69. 
16 Capie and Collins, “Banks, industry, and finance, 1880-1914”; Capie and Collins, “Industrial 
lending by English commercial banks, 1860s-1914; Baker and Collins, “English Commercial 
Bank Stability”; Baker and Collins, “English industrial distress before 1914 and the response of 
the banks”; Collins and Baker Commercial Banks. 
17 See Michael Collins “The banking crisis of 1878”, Economic History Review, vol. 42 (No. 4, 
1989); Michael Collins “English bank lending and the financial crisis of the 1870s”, Business 
History, vol. 32 (No. 2, 1990); Mae Baker and Michael Collins, “Financial crises and structural 
change in English commercial bank assets, 1860-1913”, Explorations in Economic History, 1999, 
Vol. 36: 428-444; Michael Collins and Mae Baker, “English commercial bank liquidity, 1860-
1913”, Accounting, Business & Financial History, 11 (Part 2, 2001): 171-91; Collins and Baker, 
“Sectoral differences in English bank asset structures”, 7 
18 For a review of this literature, see Lucy Newton, “Government, the banks, and industry in inter-
war Britain”, 145-70 in Terry Gourvish (ed), Business and Politics in Europe, 1900-1970. Essays 
in honour of Alice Teichova (Cambridge, 2003), 156. 
  9shown that most commercial bank support for industry constituted short-term 
credits for cash flow and working capital; the mean duration of loans 
(allowing for renewals of overdrafts) varying from 13-19 months at different 
sub-periods, while the median duration was only 8-12 months.  Some loans 
were rolled over for long periods, but the fact that they could be recalled at 
short notice precluded borrowers from using funds for illiquid purposes such 
as capital expenditure.
 19  Meanwhile unsecured loans, which accounted for 
64.6 per cent of all industrial loans during the whole 1880-1914 period, had 
declined to only 27.3 per cent by 1910-14 (the remainder requiring collateral 
that almost always covered the full value of the outstanding loan).
20  Collins 
and Baker explain this in terms of the growth of incorporation, which removed 
the unlimited liability of many businesses.
21  However, this trend also 
coincided with the move from local to national banks. 
  Baker and Collins argue that, even by 1914, the absorption of regional, 
by national, banks had led to the nurturing of a highly liquid industrial loans 
portfolio, a decline in credit provision to the private sector, and an overall rise 
                         
19 Capie and Collins, “Banks, industry, and finance”, 54-8; idem, “Industrial lending by English 
commercial banks”, 34;  Collins and Baker, Commercial Banks, 196 and 198; idem, “British 
commercial bank support”, 48.   
20 Capie and Collins, “Banks, industry, and finance”, 43 and Collins and Baker, “British 
commercial bank support”, 48.  
21 Collins and Baker, “British commercial bank support”, 48. 
  10in bank liquidity.
22    They also found that while banks were often prepared to 
continue support for distressed borrowers, they maintained an arms length 
approach even during such crises. Rather than intervention, their key strategy 
for minimising bad debts was avoiding entering into relationships with 
potentially problematic clients.
23   
By the end of the final major banking merger wave, in 1918, London-
based head offices had assumed unprecedented importance in vetting loans.  
Practice varied between banks; the Midland, National Provincial, and 
Westminster adopted a centralised policy, while Lloyds was somewhat less 
centralised, local committees giving opinions on loan applications.
24 Barclays 
adopted the most decentralised vetting system among the major banks, its 
system of ‘local boards’, with discretion regarding advances below £20,000, 
having been cited as a reason for its success in expanding its proportion of the 
Big Five’s interwar advances.
25  Once established, centralisation proved 
enduring.  In November 1936 W. F. Crick, (head of the Midland’s intelligence 
department and de facto its chief economist)
26   stated in private evidence to 
                         
22 Baker and Collins, “English Commercial Bank Stability”, 510; Collins and Baker, “Sectoral 
differences in English bank asset structures”, 19. 
23 Baker and Collins, “English industrial distress”, 22-3.   
24 W. A. Thomas, The Finance of British Industry, 1918-1976 (London, 1978), 57. 
25 Ackrill and Hannah, Barclays, 91. 
26 Duncan M. Ross, “Bank advances and industrial production in the United Kingdom during the 
inter-war years: a red herring?” in P. L. Cottrell, Hakan Lindgren and Alice Teichova (eds.), 
  11the Oxford Economists Research Group [OERG] that local branch managers 
generally had very little discretion over loans, though this varied between 
banks. They could refuse palpably unacceptable applications, but had no 
power to grant loans, their positive influence being limited to the comments 
that accompanied each application.
27   
  Concentration was accompanied by the development of an interest rate 
cartel among the London clearing banks.  There is also some evidence that 
banks were reluctant to take business from each other, at least during times of 
unsettled business or international conditions.  For example John Rae, Chief 
General Manager of the Westminster Bank, told the Macmillan Committee 
that, ‘I have had fairly big approaches from customers of other banks wanting 
me to take on business, but out of regard for the other banks I did not feel 
justified in taking on that business.’
28  Occasionally more formal arrangements 
were introduced, for example a Head Office circular issued by William 
Deacons Bank in September 1938 (at the time of the Munich crisis) informed 
its staff that: ‘it has been agreed by the Clearing Banks that, in the present 
circumstances and until further notice, no Bank will take an a/c from another 
                                                      
European Industry and Banking Between the Wars. A Review of Bank-Industry Relations 
(Leicester, 1992), 188. 
27 BLPES, ABS 352-VII, report of visit by F. W. Crick of the Midland Bank to the Oxford 
Economists Research Group, 28 November 1936.   
28 Macmillan Committee, minutes of evidence, 7. 
  12Bank.’
29  
Evidence also suggests that following the merger wave there was a 
move towards quantitative credit rationing.   In August 1922 the business 
magazine System published an interview with an unnamed bank manager who 
explained that headquarters’ vetting took account not only of the merits of the 
proposal, but of the, ‘bulk total of requests made by the branches all over the 
country… If the bulk of the loans asked for at any given moment is too heavy, 
then it means that some of the loans must be refused – not because they are 
bad security, but because of the general condition of the loanable funds of the 
bank at that moment’.
30  Such quantitative rationing, at times when the overall 
ratio of advances to deposits significantly exceeded the banks’ 50 per cent 
upper benchmark, was also mentioned by John Rae, Chief General Manager of 
the Westminster (in evidence to the Macmillan Committee), who noted that 
his bank had on occasion had to call in advances due to their high aggregate 
advances ratio.
31
  Crick provided further corroboration, explaining to the OERG that 
banks engaged in quantitative rationing during periods of financial stringency, 
such as 1928 to the beginning of 1930 (when a reduction in deposits raised the 
                         
29 RBSGA: GB 1502/WD/100/28, Head Office Circular, William Deacons Bank, 29 September 
1938. 
30 Max Rittenberg, “Getting more capital for a small business”, System (August 1922): 100-130, 
101-101. Emphasis in original. 
31 Macmillan Committee, minutes of evidence, 6-7. 
  13advances ratio from 55 to 58 per cent; the banks’ preferred maximum being 
given as 50 per cent).  Refusals were concentrated among new customers, in 
order that long-established clients would be properly financed – paralleling the 
clearing banks’ post-1945 rationing criteria.
32 Similarly, the bank manager 
interviewed in System noted that when loans had to be rationed: ‘obviously 
they will be allotted to customers of old standing, for their normal trading 
requirements, rather than to the expansion of young enterprises.’
33
  The potential monopoly power of the Big Five gave rise to 
considerable political controversy.  Government responded by appointing  the 
Colwyn Committee in 1918. The Committee’s report ended the merger boom 
and, while further amalgamations occurred, mergers between the Big Five 
were effectively prohibited.  It noted the danger of reduced competition in the 
banking sector and the possibility of the emergence of a single ‘Money Trust’ 
with control over British clearing banking.  The banks countered such 
criticism by arguing that amalgamation would lead to increased competition 
among the remaining banks.  They also defended their actions on industrial 
                         
32 BLPES, ABS 352-VII, report of visit by F. W. Crick of the Midland Bank to the Oxford 
Economists Research Group, 28 November 1936. For the post-war period, Francesca Carnevali 
and Leslie Hannah, “The effects of banking cartels and credit rationing on U.K. industrial 
structure and economic performance since World War Two”, in Michael D. Bordo and Richard 
Sylla (eds.), Anglo-American Financial Systems. Institutions and Markets in the Twentieth 
Century (Burr Ridge IL, 1995): 65-88, 75. 
33 Rittenberg, “Getting more capital”, 101-102. 
  14finance grounds, arguing that larger banks would be better placed to meet the 
needs of the post-war industrial recovery and the demands of the larger 
enterprises that were emerging from the industrial merger wave.  In addition to 
efficiency gains from increased scale, they would be able to loan funds based 
on national, rather than local, pools of deposits.
34
Carnevali has highlighted the heavy bias towards national banking 
interests among the Colwyn Committee’s  expert witnesses and the strong 
representation of bankers in its membership. Only one manufacturer, Thomas 
Bertram Johnston, was called to give evidence, and argued strongly – citing 
examples from the Bristol area - that support for local manufacturing ceased 
once local banks were taken over by national groups. Carnevali also argues 
that the evidence presented by banking interests in favour of large-scale 
banking presented an exaggerated picture of the degree to which British 
industry had become concentrated, and the extent to which Germany and 
Britain’s other principal competitors had banking systems dominated by large 
combines.
35 Similarly, few independent contemporary commentators accepted 
the bankers’ arguments; even The Economist noting that a major part of the 
banking system was centralising decision-making: 
to a degree that savours of the Government office and 
ration[ing]… its credit on a mathematical basis that takes little 
                         
34 Newton, “Government, the banks, and industry”, 146-7. 
35 Carnevali, Europe’s Advantage, Chapter 2. 
  15heed of trade imponderabilia; [meanwhile] the other seems to be 
seeking some means… to restore a shadow of local autonomy to 
the units it has absorbed.  We sincerely hope the latter method will 
prevail… not only that revival of district boards of leading 
residents who understand local conditions, but running pari passu 
with them extended and more trusted official district management. 
 At present far too much goes to London.
36
 
Similar points were made in Lavington’s 1921 study of the English 
capital market, which noted that amalgamation had been accompanied by a 
centralisation of decision-making, a more ‘mechanical’ approach to vetting 
loan applications, and a switch in emphasis from assessment of the borrower 
to the security offered, thus excluding, ‘business men who may be unable to 
offer security for a supply of capital but whose character and abilities give 
them a good social title to its use.’
37  Such a mechanical approach was, in part, 
necessitated by centralised decision-making.  ‘Local knowledge’ is highly 
‘tacit’ (not amenable to formal codification) and thus not easily transmissible 
upward through a hierarchical decision-making process, especially where this 
is separated by distance.  Basing lending on criteria such as appropriate 
collateral facilitated the development of clear rules that could be easily 
                         
36 “British banking and industry”, Economist (21 May 1938): 1037-8. 
37 F. Lavington, The English Capital Market (London, 1921), 143. 
  16communicated from head office to branch managers, thus avoiding 
misunderstandings or ambiguities within the decision-making system 
regarding what constituted appropriate business.
38  
Moreover, collateral requirements constituted a low cost screening 
process. Banking theory suggests that banks maximise profits by engaging in 
transactions which incur the lowest marginal costs relative to the price 
charged. These include ex ante assessment of loan propositions and ex-post 
monitoring of clients. Knowledge regarding the inherent risk of the loan is 
highly biased towards the borrower, while tacit information is concentrated 
among local business networks. Lenders without access to such networks are 
likely to find gathering information a costly and time-consuming process, 
which imposes high transactions costs.
39 They are therefore unlikely to engage 
in such gathering – unless competitive pressures by rival banks force them to 
do so.  
The emergence of nationally-based banks thus resulted in a 
transformation of the banking system from ‘relationship banking’ – 
underpinned by close personal monitoring of clients by bank directors 
                         
38 Carnevali and Hannah, “The effects of banking cartels”, 75.  The archives contain numerous 
volumes of memoranda or circulars sent from bank head offices to their branches with specific 
instructions to staff and forms to complete with regard to lending decision-making criteria.  See 
for example RBSGA: WD/100/25, 99. 
39 Carnevali, Europe’s Advantage, 9. 
  17embedded in their local business milieu - towards ‘transaction banking’,
40 
characterised by bureaucratic and centralised decision-making; short-term 
loans; formal screening and monitoring processes; and an emphasis on 
collateral security .
41  Analysis of 586 English commercial bank loans to 
industry over the period 1920-39 by Collins and Baker revealed that the mean 
length had fallen to 6.5 months and the median six months, with 99 per cent 
being granted in the first instance for a year or less.  Meanwhile some 86 per 
                         
40 See also Lucy Newton, “Trust and virtue in English banking: the assessment of borrowers by 
bank managements at the turn of the nineteenth century”, Financial History Review, 7 (Part 2, 
2000): 177-99, 182-3; I. Morrison, “Moral conflicts in commercial banking”, in S. F. Frowen and 
F. P. McHugh (eds.), Financial Decision-making and Moral Responsibility (Basingstoke, 1995), 
57; R. S. Sayers, Lloyds Bank in the History of English Banking (Oxford, 1957), 271; P. L. 
Cottrell, Industrial Finance 1830-1914: The Finance and Organisation of Manufacturing Industry 
(London, 1979), 236-44 
41 In its most extreme form, transaction banking involves the bank treating each loan as a separate 
transaction and not drawing upon any long-term bank/client relationship that may exist.  In turn, 
customers are free to operate in the lending market to seek the most preferential borrowing terms.  
In this system banks lend for short periods, have a highly liquid portfolio, engage in rigorous 
screening and monitoring of borrowing customers and require collateral in order to ease the 
recovery of debt in cases of default.  A less extreme form of this type of banking was practiced by 
the main British clearing banks.  See Baker and Collins, “English Commercial Bank Stability”, 
504-5 and 510; Collins and Baker, Commercial banks and industrial finance, 53-5; Michael 
Collins and Mae Baker, “English bank business loans, 1920-1968: transaction bank characteristics 
and small firm discrimination”, Financial History Review, 2005, 12.2: 136-8. 
  18cent of loans were ostensibly for working capital (with only 6 per cent for 
fixed capital expenditure) and 84 per cent were covered by collateral security. 
 They also found that the application of standardised screening procedures to 
restrict business to low-risk borrowers appears to have mitigated against 
SMEs.
42
Banks justified their policies on grounds of liquidity and safety, 
stressing their essential obligation to depositors. As A. G. Sugg of the 
Westminster explained in 1927, the banker, ‘has to bear in mind that the 
money he would like to loan … is derived from other customers’ deposits, 
largely repayable on demand, and he must always aim, therefore, at keeping 
his position liquid, his assets easily realisable, his loans of short duration, and, 
of course, well secured’.
43  Loans were often ‘rolled over’ for longer periods 
than originally granted, but banks tried to safeguard themselves against a 
gradual transformation of short into long-term advances by reconsidering 
every advance at least annually and customers were deterred from using 
ostensibly short-term loans for long-term purposes by the knowledge that 
                         
42 Collins and Baker, “British commercial bank support”; idem, “English bank business loans”. 
This later article notes (139) that surviving data are likely to have excluded small loans and 
therefore their sample is biased. 
43 A. G. Sugg, “When you ask the banker for a loan”, System (July 1927): 31-7. See also BLPES, 
ABS 352-VII, report of visit by F. W. Crick of the Midland Bank to the Oxford Economists 
Research Group, 28 November 1936. 
  19renewal was by no means automatic.
44
 
The Macmillan gap identified 
To what extent did these changes impact disproportionately on smaller 
firms? Provincial industrialists and their organisations made frequent 
complaints that centralisation, together with the banks’ more mechanical 
approach to loan applications, was disadvantaging them.  For example, 
following a complaint received by Lloyds from the Secretary of the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce in November 1931, H. E. Levitt of the 
Institute of Bankers visited the Bradford and Manchester Chambers of 
Commerce and reported: 
a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the Banks … Many people 
stated that Foreign Banks in London were far more enterprising 
than English Banks and were anxious to help even the small 
businessman.  There were also many complaints against the policy 
of centralisation.  It was said that not only was the banking system 
being mechanised, but that local managers were being turned into 
machines for the transmission of requests to Head Office.
45
When questioned regarding the impact of bank amalgamations on loans to 
                         
44 BLPES, ABS 352-VII, report of visit by F. W. Crick of the Midland Bank to the Oxford 
Economists Research Group, 28 November 1936. 
45 LTSBGA: File 2327, General Management files. 
  20new and small businesses, Crick stated that he thought amalgamation had 
reduced the volume of such advances, which he viewed as, ‘all to the good, as 
it was precisely this type of advance which had been responsible for so many 
bank failures in the past.’
46  Yet he denied that ‘legitimate borrowing by small 
businesses’ was being turned down.
47  The question of what constituted 
‘legitimate borrowing’ was to underpin much of the interwar debate on the 
Macmillan gap.   
The official histories of the Midland and Barclays noted that they 
conducted a large volume of industrial lending, regarded this as an important area 
of business, and often repeatedly renewed overdrafts.
48 Yet a substantial 
proportion of this renewed lending concerned long-term indebtedness by firms in 
the staple industries, which had embarked on a spree of speculative investment in 
the immediate aftermath of the First World War, much of which served only to 
bid up the value of existing plant. Following the collapse of the short post-war 
boom, the banks found themselves saddled with heavy loans to companies that 
often had no immediate prospect of repaying them. In these circumstances, they 
felt obliged to continue assistance, in order to prevent a sudden collapse of these 
                         
46 BLPES, ABS 352-VII, report of visit by F. W. Crick of the Midland Bank to the Oxford 
Economists Research Group, 28 November 1936.  This was somewhat disingenuous as there had 
been few bank failures since the middle of the nineteenth century.   
47 ibid. 
48 A. R. Holmes and Edwin Green, Midland. 150 years of banking business (London, 1986), 
179-80. 
  21sectors and the transformation of problematic debts into bad ones. For example, 
in the cotton industry, both national and Lancashire banks continued to support 
struggling firms, an increasing proportion of bank assets thus becoming frozen in 
this sector.  Similarly, the ailing steel industry accounted for 7¾ per cent of 
Midland’s overdrafts; 10 per cent of National Provincial’s, and 3.4 per cent of 
Lloyds’, in 1928. Again the banks provided protracted (though, in Tolliday’s 
view, unwilling) support for ailing firms.
49
Such debts were eventually alleviated, either due to a return to more 
prosperous conditions (as in steel), or, as in cotton, on account of Bank of 
England sponsored industrial rationalisation programmes. Yet the banks were 
reluctant to become involved in industrial restructuring and, Bamberg argues, the 
motivation of the Bank of England in sponsoring rationalisation was to protect 
the banks as opposed to offering serious solutions for industry.
50  Many effected 
companies also proved hostile to rationalisation schemes, their opposition 
contributing to the banks’ reluctance to support such interventions.
51   
Despite a few case-studies, there is very little systematic demand-side 
evidence regarding the extent to which demands for credit from smaller firms 
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  22(or those in sectors where the banks were less committed by indebtedness) 
went un-met - one major problem being the survival of documents.
52    What is 
clear from the available evidence is that bank lending to trade and industry 
was viewed as  problematic by contemporaries.  By the early 1930s a number 
of well-informed commentators, such as  Henry Clay,
53  were calling for the 
banks to use more sophisticated vetting procedures, based on the merits of the 
proposal rather than the collateral security.  This would involve employing 
expert industrial knowledge; banks were criticised for having insufficient 
technical knowledge to vet loans on their own merits, thus forcing them to fall 
back on liquidity and security as screening mechanisms.
54  Meanwhile the 
high fixed costs of expert technical knowledge inhibited entry into the 
industrial finance sector by new firms that would be initially relatively small 
in scale.
55  
                         
52 For contrasting example, see Roy Church, Kenricks in Hardware (1969), 18; A. E. 
Harrison, ”F. Hopper & Co. – The problems of capital supply in the cycle manufacturing 
industry, 1891-1914”, Business History, 24 (1982): 3-23. The lack of evidence from a 
business perspective after 1914 is also noted in Tolliday, Business, Banking and Politics. 
53 Henry Clay was a distinguished economist, who jointed the Bank of England in 1930 and acted 
as economic advisor to the Governor from 1933-44. 
54 T. Balogh, Studies in Financial Organisation (Cambridge, 1947), 288; Thomas, Finance of 
British Industry, 57-8. 
55 A. T. K. Grant, A Study of the Capital Market in Britain from 1919-1936 (2
nd edn., London, 
1967), 279. 
  23In response to widespread public criticism, from a broad political 
spectrum, the Labour government launched the Macmillan Committee enquiry in 
1929.  The public reaction to its report, published in 1931, focused on its finding 
that: ‘It has been represented to us that great difficulty is experienced by the 
smaller and medium-sized businesses in raising... capital... even when the 
security offered is perfectly sound’ – which soon became known as the 
Macmillan gap.
56  While ‘capital’ could be interpreted as not strictly 
encompassing loan finance, the reference to ‘security’ indicates that the 
Macmillan Committee were using the word in a broad context; as a Bank of 
England memorandum noted, ‘resources’, rather than capital, might have more 
adequately reflected their meaning.
57
Wealthy individuals had traditionally been an important source of long-
term finance for small companies.  Yet private funding of new businesses by 
individual capitalists was said to have diminished after the First World War, both 
due to changes in personal taxation and the growth of indirect investment 
vehicles such as insurance companies and investment trusts.
58 The impact of 
taxation may have resulted primarily from its form rather than its level (which 
was still very low by post-1945 standards)  – death duties, or, rather, their 
avoidance, made it desirable for wealthy individuals to hold investments in liquid 
                         
56 Committee on Finance and Industry, Report (Cmnd. 3897 of 1931), para. 404.  
57 Bank of England Archive (hereafter BEA), SMT2/308, “Finance for small businesses,” 
memorandum, 8 May 1944. 
  24form rather than in loans to, or shares in, unquoted companies.
59
  While large companies could turn to the stock market for long-term 
funds, a flotation was usually impracticable for firms requiring relatively small 
sums. The Macmillan Committee viewed £200,000 as the minimum economic 
size for a public issue.  Analysis by J. B. Selwyn of new industrial issues during 
1937 (when a number of institutions had already been launched with a view to 
reducing the cost of small issues) indicated that the cost of raising new preference 
and ordinary share capital of less than £150,000 was 11.6 per cent of the overall 
value for public issues and 17.1 per cent for public offers - where an issuing 
house bought the entire block of shares and then re-sold them via a prospectus 
issue. The average cost for all new capital (issues and offers) involving £150,000 
or less was given as 15.0 per cent, compared to 6.9 per cent for those over 
£150,000.  Meanwhile very small issues (below £50,000) were found to have an 
even higher expenses ratio, possibly in the order of 20 per cent (though the small 
numbers involved made assessment more difficult).
60 It was generally held that, 
while transactions costs might be lowered to permit some smaller public issues, 
market-based City institutions were unsuitable for bridging (as opposed to 
constricting) the Macmillan Gap.  For example, in private evidence to the OERG, 
Mr Davenport of stockbrokers Chase, Henderson and Tennant stated that an 
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60 BEA, EID4/31, “The Cost of Raising Capital” memorandum, J. B. Selwyn, Economics and 
  25important gap did exist, but that the City would never be able to fill it, ‘as… 




The changed environment of the 1930s 
During the 1930s the clearing banks faced declining advances;  by 
1933 these  had fallen to 76.6 per cent of their 1929 value and annualised data 
for the first ten months of 1934 give a ratio of only 76.0 per cent.
62 A key 
factor was the banks’ response to the government’s new ‘cheap money’ 
policy, introduced in the aftermath of Britain’s exit from the gold standard in 
September 1931.  The banks resisted lowering overdraft rates in line with 
market rates.  Other financial institutions also tried to temper reductions, 
instead competing by liberalising loan terms or moving into higher-yielding 
investments.  Yet the banks rejected liberalisation (a policy adopted, with 
considerable success by the building society movement) or widening the scope 
of their investments (the approach taken, for example, by the insurance 
companies, which expanded into areas such as ordinary shares, industrial 
mortgages, and leaseback finance). In both these cases the change in policy 
                                                      
Statistics Section 11 April 1938; Balogh, Studies in Financial Organisation, 294-5. 
61 BLPES, AB 3352, VI4, OERG, meeting with Mr. Davenport of Chase Henderson and Tennant, 
5 November 1937. 
62 HSBCGA, 193/03/07, Midland Bank Intelligence Dept. memorandum, 4 Dec. 1934. 
  26had been stimulated by intense competition within their sectors.
63 Conversely, 
 the banks aimed for safety and high margins, relying on their tight cartel and 
near monopoly position (at least with regard to most small/medium firms) to 
maintain loan volumes.  Despite their low advances ratios and political 
pressure for lower interest rates and/or liberalised lending criteria, the 1930s 
did not witness any significant modification of lending policy.
64 The banks 
succeeded in combining an increased premium on overdrafts (relative to the 
Bank of England base rate) with an extremely low level of bad debts – at the 
expense of a fall in market share.
65   
The sharpest declines involved larger firms, which turned to the stock 
exchange to replace bank loans by lower interest debenture issues. Firms of all 
sizes also made increased use of extra-bank lending. Insurance companies 
began to offer both long-term mortgage and leaseback finance to industry and 
shorter-term loans on security, while building societies provided considerable 
 finance for the booming residential building sector and engaged in some 
mortgage lending on commercial premises.
 66 Such encroachments were very 
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  27limited in scope; for example insurance companies generally excluded 
industrial premises from mortgages and leaseback deals, while building 
societies mainly confined their activities to the building sector. Yet they were 
nevertheless irksome to the banks, as they tied up the type of collateral that 
might be used as security for bank advances. Hire purchase [HP] finance 
houses also expanded instalment finance on industrial equipment and plant, 
yet still accounted for only around £2.5 million of producer credit by 1938.
67  
The growth of such competition (mainly limited in scope to loans directly 
secured by marketable assets), together with extra-bank competition for 
deposits, contributed to a substantial relative decline in the weighting of the 
banking sector in Britain’s domestic financial framework, as shown in Table 
1.  Having accounted for 49.9 per cent of total financial assets in 1924, the 
contribution of UK banks fell to 45.7 per cent in 1929 and 43.3 per cent in 
1937; while the share of the Big Five appears to have fallen even more 
sharply.
68  
The banks became very concerned about their declining market share and 
historically low advances ratios.  Crick conducted regular analyses of the 
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  28Midland’s advances to explore the reasons behind their sluggish growth and the 
particularly dramatic decline in industrial advances, which had fallen from  
Table 1: The asset distribution of UK financial institutions, 1920-38 (%) 
 
Year Total  assets 
(£ M) 
Percentage contribution of particular 
intermediaries  





















































Source:  D. K. Sheppard, The growth and role of financial institutions, 1880-
1962 (London, 1971), 3. 
 
64.8 per cent of advances in February 1934 to 53.4 per cent by February 
1938.
69 He identified a combination of demand factors (including the growing 
integration of industry) together with the recovery of the new issues market 
during a period of cheap money and the growth of extra-bank competition.
70 
In the light of their declining advances, the banks adopted a very defensive 
attitude to what they saw as encroachments into their core business.  In 1933 
the chairman of Lloyds complained that finance houses were now providing 
                         
69 HSBCGA, 193/03/07, Midland Bank Intelligence Department, “comments on the results of the 
classification of advances,” 1 March 1938. 
70 Ross, “Bank advances and industrial production in the United Kingdom”, 195-7. 
  29‘loans of a purely joint stock banking character.’
71   One case involved a 
French coal trading company’s use of non-bank credit in preference to the 
services of their Swansea branch.  The final letter on this case from Lloyds’ 
chief controller of advances noted that it entailed ‘provision of working capital 
… accepting houses are giving their acceptances for a class of business that 
really should be financed on Bank overdrafts … the business of the Clearing 
Banks is being “cut into”...’
72  
Yet one area in which the banks still faced relatively little competition 
was lending to smaller businesses (with the exception of mortgages on non-
industrial premises).  Small accounts formed a considerable proportion of total 
advances; in 1935 the average advances of the Westminster, Midland, Barclays 
and Lloyds were only £1,070, £976, £774, and £806 respectively.
73 Yet during 
the early 1930s the Bank of England proposed to introduce a new competitor 
into even this area of business, to which the banks’ response was, not 
surprisingly, cool. 
 
The new industrial finance organisations 
                         
71 Quoted in Thomas, The Finance of British Industry, 70. 
72 LTSBGA: HO/O/Off/12/file 6842, letter from chief controller, advances department, 12th 
March 1936.  
73 Sources: Lloyds - Data provided by Mark Billings; others - HSBCGA: 193/03/02; RBSGA 
WES/1174/253, speeches by Charles Lidbury 1931-37.  Disaggregated data for private and 
business accounts are not available.   
  30  As Carnevali has shown, large French and German banks made a 
similar transition from relationship to transaction banking at around the end of 
the nineteenth century, yet state intervention ensured that new banking 
institutions emerged to serve local business networks. These countries, and 
Italy, all experienced difficult relationships between nationally-based banks 
and small-medium firms, but smaller firms were protected via government 
support for segmented and specialised banking systems, in which local banks 
were allowed to concentrate on local industrial finance.
74
    The political power of Britain’s small business sector was much 
weaker than that of its European counterparts. In 1930 firms employing 11-99 
people accounted for only 24 per cent of employees for British manufacturers 
with over 10 workers, compared to 35 per cent in Italy and 37 per cent in 
France.
75 Yet in the more interventionist political environment of the early 
1930s, and in the aftermath of the Macmillan Report, government proved 
more willing to intervene to assist the small firm sector, albeit at arms-length, 
via the Bank of England. The Bank’s Chairman, Montague Norman,  was 
predisposed towards bridging perceived gaps in the British financial system by 
encouraging the establishment of specialised financial institutions.
76 In 1932 he 
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  31made tentative efforts to meet the Macmillan Committee’s criticism by 
establishing an ‘Industrial Mortgage Corporation’, financed by the banks.   
However the Committee of London Clearing Bankers [CLCB] rejected this 
proposal.
77 Yet in the light of continuing public pressure, on February 1st 1934 
Norman informed them that: 
owing to great pressure from Downing Street, he had decided that we 
could no longer put off the formation of this company… it was a 
matter of policy that all the banks should assist owing to the public 




The proposed company was to have a capital of £500,000, of which the 
Bank of England would contribute £100,000, the Big Five £50,000 each, and the 
smaller banks £10,000 each (the balance to be raised from two or three additional 
sources).  Individual mortgages were not to exceed £50,000, or last for more than 
ten years.  Four of the Big Five proved willing to go along with the Governor’s 
proposals, the exception being Reginald McKenna of the Midland, who refused 
to subscribe more than £20,000.  He asked the CLCB (apparently with the 
                         
77 NLS, Acc. 8699/1, memorandum of the Chief Executive Officers of the Committee of Clearing 
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  32support of Lloyds) to consider a proposition by Charterhouse Investment Trust to 
set up a similar company (provisionally titled the Middle-Term Industrial Finance 
Corporation), ‘which would relieve the Bank of England from any 
participation… and would not involve a contribution from the big banks of more 
than £10,000 each.  This would also avoid the necessity of the banks’ 




 on March 6
th Norman informed the CLCB that the Bank of 
England had decided not to participate in the Charterhouse proposal.  He 
hinted that he was suspicious regarding whether the company would make a 
genuine contribution to bridging the Macmillan Gap:  
If… the Charterhouse Trust sets up a company bona fide to do an 
industrial mortgage business in such a way as to fill the present 
need and to satisfy demands for this class of facility, we will make 
no move.  But if, in your opinion, this is not the case, we should 
feel bound to proceed with the alternative scheme…’
80  
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  33Norman may also have been deterred by Charterhouse’s dubious 
reputation.  One of its founders, Sir Arthur Wheeler, had been convicted on 26 
counts of fraudulent conversion in October 1931 (by which time he had left the 
Charterhouse Board) in a major scandal which almost led to Charterhouse being 
wound up and, at the height of which, one of its directors, Walter Burt, had 
committed suicide by throwing himself in front of a tube train.
81 The clearing 
bankers were also less than sanguine about the proposal; the representative of 
Martin’s bank reported back that, of the large banks, only Lloyds appeared likely 
to agree to join Midland in subscribing to the Charterhouse venture.
82  
In March 1934 Norman informed the CLCB that United Dominions Trust 
had made a satisfactory offer to establish a small firm finance company without 
the need for a direct financial contribution from the banks, via a new subsidiary – 
Credit for Industry Ltd [CFI].  This proposal received the Committee’s support, 
their requested participation being limited to providing the company with 
ordinary banking facilities.
83 CFI constituted the only substantial national attempt 
to breach the Macmillan gap for typical small companies (rather than medium-
large firms that might soon be suitable for a public share issue).  Its performance 
is discussed below. 
The Bank of England was also instrumental in establishing special 
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  34financial facilities for new firms in four severely depressed ‘Special Areas’ – 
Clydeside, Durham and Tyneside, part of South Wales, and West Cumberland 
(excluding major cities in these areas, with the exception of Newcastle).  In 
June 1936, following government pressure, it persuaded the banks, in 
conjunction with other financial institutions and industrial concerns, to launch 
the Special Areas Reconstruction Association (SARA) as a political gesture to 
help the Special Areas.
84 SARA was designed to provide loans to breach initial 
financial difficulties, for concerns that, ‘...whilst having reasonable 
expectation of ultimate success on an economic basis... are not for the time 
being in a position to obtain financial facilities from banks or financial 
institutions primarily engaged in providing financial facilities for long or 
medium periods’.
85 This initiative was later supplemented by the Nuffield 
Trust, financed by a gift of £2 million from Lord Nuffield, and  the Treasury 
Fund,  with a further £2 million - available to both the Special Areas and the 
more widely defined ‘certified’ depressed areas. These bodies enjoyed a 
strong measure of cooperation; they shared a number of key staff and jointly 
financed a substantial proportion of projects. 
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  35According to a Bank of England memorandum, finance provided by the 
Special Areas finance organizations [SAO’s] to the end of January 1939 
amounted to £3,825,000, for some 207 enterprises, of which 109 were new to the 
Special Areas.  About a third of these were located on government-financed 
trading estates.
86 Though they pursued more liberal lending policies than the 
other industrial finance organizations, their performance sheds little light on the 
scope of the national Macmillan gap. They were limited to very small and 
severely depressed areas, none of which (with the partial exception of Clydeside) 
had any significant light manufacturing base or representation of expanding 
sectors.  Conversely, many assisted firms involved refugee industrialists from 
Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, who were effectively ‘directed’ to these 
areas under the refugees’ admissions process.  Some other clients were large 
firms, which opened branch factories. Moreover these bodies (particularly the 
Nuffield Trust and Treasury Fund) were motivated by employment creation 
rather than purely commercial considerations.  
However, one interesting aspect of this initiative involved attempts at 
‘active investment’ - providing financial and managerial advice as well as 
capital.  SARA employed trained accountants and other technical experts to 
vet applications to the SAO’s and make inspection visits to smaller clients.
87 
One of these, Cecil D. Morrison, was later employed by the Nuffield Trust to 
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  36visit firms and make recommendations concerning management or 
accountancy practices (sometimes even becoming a director).
88 Such after-care 
services bore some similarities to the ‘active investment’ modus operandi of 
the venture capital industry that emerged in the United States after 1945, 
involving participation in the management of assisted concerns, as directors 
rather than passive financiers.
89 After-care was developed more fully, with 
some success, in the government’s post-war regionally assisted areas 
industrial finance machinery, at a cost equivalent to an additional interest rate 
of around 0.25 per cent.
90  
 
Reducing the upper limit of the Macmillan Gap 
Despite failing to gain acceptance as the Bank of England’s ‘champion’, 
Charterhouse Investment Trust went ahead with its proposal to form a new 
subsidiary, now re-named the Charterhouse Industrial Development Co. [CID], in 
June 1934.  However, as Norman had suspected, this organisation proved much 
more limited in scope than either the Bank of England’s proposed ‘Industrial 
Mortgage Company,’ or CFI.  Its stated purpose was, ‘to finance industrial 
business whose capital falls below the limit with which existing Issue Houses can 
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  37deal by way of public issue or placing.’
91 CID is one of the best known of the 
Macmillan gap institutions and its very limited volume of business has been cited 
as evidence that there was no significant gap.
92 Yet in fact its scope and funds 
were severely limited.   Furthermore, it was only one of a number of similar 
companies launched by issuing houses, merchant banks, and other organisations 
during the 1930s, some of which pursued more active lending policies. 
CID had an authorised capital of £500,000, all of which was issued by 
November 1935. Charterhouse held 53 per cent (including all the original issued 
capital), while the Prudential subscribed 40 per cent and the Lloyds and Midland 
banks took 5 per cent and 2 per cent respectively.
93 It sought only concerns that 
would be suitable for a public issue within a few years (which would be handled 
via the Charterhouse Investment Trust); indeed the primary aim of CID was  to 
generate new issues business.
94 Eligible clients were further restricted to firms 
already operating commercially with a satisfactory profit record covering at least 
three years; that offered the prospect of becoming big businesses; and that had a 
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  38management that was both capable of coping with this expanded scale and held a 
substantial financial interest in the business.
95 This type of assistance, involving 
‘nursing’ companies in preparation for a public issue, was already being 
undertaken by a few companies, such as Investment Registry Ltd and the 
Industrial Finance and Investment Corporation (which was associated with the 
Prudential and held £174,000 of unquoted investments by September 1935).
96   
Applicants were vetted both by its own staff and independent 
accountants, valuers, or solicitors (at the applicant’s expense) - firms employed 
including Price Waterhouse; Merret, Son & Street; Spicer & Pegler; and 
Thomson McLintock.
97 CID required board representation, via a director who 
would exercise specific control over borrowing powers, capital expenditure, and 
increases in management remuneration. It demanded both fixed interest and 
equity participation - through either a direct ordinary share allocation, share 
options, or ‘by attaching participation rights to the fixed interest bearing 
capital’.
98 In most cases it  acquired a controlling interest: its balance sheet for 
30
th September 1937 showed a cumulative investment of £403,575 in shares or 
debentures of companies where a controlling interest was held, together with 
£191,111 in other concerns.
99
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  39  CID received over 7,000 propositions by February 1940, but had 
proceeded with only 17.
100 It appears to have been relatively inactive after its first 
year of operation; nine of its 17 clients had received funding by September 1935, 
several others had been at least partially approved, and most of its original funds 
had been deployed.
101 Yet despite its short period of activity CID was successful 
in relation to its modest scale of operations.  Gross profits increased from 
£10,032 in 1936 to £32,851 in 1939, by which time it had also accumulated 
reserves of £99,100.
102 Moreover, new issues business from CID generated major 
additional profits for Charterhouse, as discussed below. 
  A very similar organisation, Leadenhall Securities, was launched in July 
1935 by the merchant bank J. Henry Schroder & Co.  Leadenhall aimed to invest 
in firms with prospects for stock market flotation within five years, in which it 
acquired a combination of ordinary and redeemable preference shares.  Again, 
new issues business was a key motivation, income being generated through 
securities dealing, ‘bond washing’ (which was not then illegal), and participation 
in underwriting syndicates.
103 By 1938 Leadenhall had an issued capital of 
£125,002  and had loaned sums of £2,000 upwards, usually for five years or less, 
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  40charging an interest rate of around 6 per cent.  The company also requested a free 
10-15 per cent equity allotment and a board representative, to act as a financial 
advisor.
104 A further company undertaking similar business was The New 
Trading Company, founded in October 1934 and largely funded by Brandeis-
Goldschmidt & Co.  This financed a number of small British businesses and 
floated several companies established in Britain by foreign interests.
105
  Another group of companies sought to assist firms that were too small for 
a conventional public issue not by holding their securities until they had reached 
the critical size, but by reducing the minimum size threshold.  One early 
innovator was the Cheviot Trust, founded by John Kinross in October 1933 to 
specialise in small issues of £25,000-100,000.  It sought to reduce the costs of 
small public issues through removing most of the advertising costs (which 
usually amounted to at least £8-10,000) by advertising the prospectus in only one 
daily paper - the minimum Stock Exchange requirement - and using direct 
mailing to active lists of small investors as its main marketing vehicle.
106
Kinross claimed that over 1934-38 he made over a hundred public issues 
of between £30,000-200,000 under various ‘labels’, at costs that never exceeded 
10 per cent of the capital raised.   29 were launched under the Cheviot name and 
about a dozen under the Covent Trust Ltd (Cheviot being reserved for what were 
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  41considered the best issues).
107 All but two of these were said to be still operating 
in the mid-1970s (some having become part of larger groups).  Ordinary shares 
were issued in small denominations, usually one shilling, so that Cheviot had 
sufficient volume for ‘making the market’ during the first few weeks of trading.  
Other issuing houses established to specialise in small company flotations 
included London Industrial Finance Trust, which made 31 issues between 1935 
and 1939, Ridgeford Industrial Investments, Lonsdale Investment Trust, and 
Whitehead Industrial Trust, founded in February 1936, which became the most 
active issuing house for this type of business.
108  
Most such organisations had a very limited capital (Cheviot had an initial 
capital of only £1,000 and a full-time staff of one).
109  Even the ‘nursing’ 
companies such as CID and Leadenhall were established by relatively small 
organisations. They thus restricted their activities to very safe propositions, as 
they could easily allocate all their limited capital to such projects, while even a 
single well-publicised failure might terminate their activities. Furthermore, both 
classes of institution sought their main profits not directly - from interest on, and 
equity in, assisted companies - but from share issue, dealing, and associated 
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  42activities – the scope for which in turn strongly influenced their criteria for 
selecting propositions. For example, Kinross stated that Cheviot made most of its 
money from dealing in surplus equity acquired in addition to the prospectus issue, 
 which was sold to the trust’s shareholders at a small premium prior to the start of 
dealing and used to make the market during the first weeks of trading, typically 
experiencing rapid price growth.
110
  As Thomas noted, most of the ‘Macmillan gap’ institutions were, in 
reality ‘mere forcing houses for potential market material … they did not in the 
main tackle the problem of finding a home for unquoted issues.’
111 While they 
played an important role in reducing the upper limit of the Macmillan gap from 
£200,000 to £50-75,000 (the level given by E.H.D. Skinner of the Bank of 
England in evidence to the Committee on Post-War Domestic Finance in 1943), 
their facilities were limited to companies almost ready for a public flotation, 
effectively excluding most industrial firms.
112 In 1935 over three quarters of 
manufacturing establishments with 11 or more employees employed fewer 
than 100 people, while even an average establishment with 100 employees had 
an annual net output of only around £22,800, well below even the modified 
Macmillan Gap threshold.
113 With the exception of the tiny Northern Territories 
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  43Trust
114 and organisations limited to the chronically depressed Special Areas, no 
venture other than CFI provided capital to small businesses.  CFI’s experience is 
thus particularly important in terms of both the Macmillan gap and the barriers 
facing new entrants seeking to bridge that gap.
.  
 
Credit for Industry 
United Dominions Trust [UDT], founded in 1919, marketed itself as a 
commercial banking company, providing, ‘a supplementary or complementary 
service’ to the facilities offered by clearing banks.
115 In practice, its core business 
was HP finance.  During the 1920s it was involved in extensive financing of new 
industrial machinery and plant - through HP and other instalment finance.
116 It 
had also established a national presence, with twelve branch offices throughout 
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  44Britain.
117
Bank of England interest in UDT began during the late 1920s, when 
Montagu Norman became concerned regarding a possible deficiency in the 
supply of medium-term credit to small-scale manufacturers and traders for 
machinery purchases.  Expanding HP finance appeared to offer a solution and 
Norman selected UDT as his champion in this field - as it was the largest HP 
finance house, had a respected and entrepreneurial leader in J. Gibson Jarvie, and 
had considerable experience of dealing with manufacturers.
118  The Bank of 
England provided  £250,000 to double UDT’s  paid-up ordinary share capital, the 
ensuing  publicity leading to UDT  being approached during the early 1930s by a 
number of industrial concerns that sought longer-term credit and/or larger sums 
than were  normally supplied under HP transactions .
119  
  Discussions between Jarvie and Norman regarding the establishment of a 
small firm finance organisation had been in progress since at least December 
1933.
120 This was provisionally entitled ‘The Industrial Credit Bank Ltd’, though 
by the time of its launch (as a wholly-owned UDT subsidiary) in March 1934 this 
had been changed to the more neutral, ‘Credit for Industry’.
121  CFI’s press 
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  45release claimed that, ‘this new company will meet a specific criticism of our 
banking system made by the Macmillan Committee...’
122 Despite Norman’s and 
Jarvie’s efforts to involve the clearing banks, the CLCB declined an invitation to 
appoint a nominee director.
123 Norman also tried to persuade a prominent 
clearing banker to serve as a director in an individual capacity.  Bromley Martin 
of Martins Bank was approached and initially accepted - subject to the consent of 
his board – but failed to gain their agreement.
124
CFI aimed to assist established concerns whose capital requirements were 
too small to be served economically via the ordinary capital market. Funding was 
available only on adequate security and to companies which had traded 
successfully and could show a profit record of at least three years.
125 No equity 
interest was ever taken, finance being restricted to loans - usually secured on 
debentures or mortgages (though on occasions funds were loaned against 
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  46‘personal undertakings supported by approved collateral’).
126 Crucially – unlike 
the banks - it was prepared to lend long-term, for capital purposes; sums of up to 
£50,000 being available, for up to twenty years.
127
  CFI planned to establish regional advisory networks.  By September 1934 
it had set up a Scottish Advisory Board, which included several prominent Scots 
businessmen.
128 By 28
th January 1935 its Scottish loans totalled £65,000, while a 
further £5,000 worth had been approved.
129  Further boards for the North of 
England and South Wales were envisaged, but the formation of SARA to finance 
firms in the Special Areas (which included substantial parts of these regions) 
appears to have led to these plans being shelved. 
  In the two months or so after March 21
st 1934, when CFI released its first 
press announcement, it received around 1,000 applications, the quality of which 
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  47was stated to be better than expected.
130 Of these: 
300 come within scope of Corporation, have been partially 
investigated, and are likely to result in loans for, say, £400,000.   
600 required further particulars; 
50 are outside the scope... 
40 or so came within the province of the United Dominions Trust.
131
 
  By June 30th 1943 CFI had loaned £896,264 to some 173 firms; loans 
ranging from a few hundred pounds to £60,000, with a mean value of £5,181.  
Applications had numbered around 8-9,000, while enquiries had been received 
from further 5-6,000 concerns.
132 Loans were widely spread by sector, though the 
largest group were the motor vehicle and engineering trades, which accounted for 
41.0 per cent of firms and 46.3 per cent of loans.
133 This may reflect UDT’s 
strong contacts in, and experience with, the motor, engineering, and allied trades 
– it was in these sectors that its HP business was initially concentrated.
134 All 
loans were to established businesses.   
The scale of CFI’s lending was substantially less than might have been 
expected given the optimistic evaluation of its early proposals.  Initial 
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  48optimism rapidly evaporated  when it became clear that it would not be 
allowed to finance a large proportion of proposals it vetted and approved. As 
Rajan and Zingales have noted, incumbent financiers have strong incentives to 
oppose measures of financial liberalisation and development, as these threaten 
to undermine their competitive advantage – through reducing their privileged 
access to, and rents from, investment opportunities, and by changing the basis 
of credit evaluation and risk management so that incumbents’ old skills 
become redundant and new ones become necessary. “Financial development 
not only introduces competition, which destroys the financial institutions’ 
rents and relationships… it also destroys the financier’s human capital.”
135  
CFI’s approach to industrial lending was much more threatening to the 
banks that the ‘nursing institutions’ reviewed above. Banks had traditionally 
assisted client firms seeking a public share issue (by, for example, allowing 
their names to be quoted in the prospectus) and innovations which enabled 
such firms to access the stock exchange a few years earlier in their 
development were not a significant challenge to them. Conversely, CFI sought 
to apply expert financial advice to the assessment of loan propositions for 
firms too small to turn to the stockmarket in the foreseeable future – 
challenging that segment of industrial business in which the banks’ monopoly 
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  49position was strongest. If successful, this approach both threatened to take 
business away from the banks and, more importantly, demonstrate the 
viability of screening mechanisms that might identify more worthy 
propositions, but at significantly greater cost than the banks’ screening 
techniques. This might, in turn, lead to renewed public pressure for the banks 
themselves to employ expert advice, raising their transaction costs and eroding 
their monopoly profits. 
The Banks had no difficulty in limiting CFI’s expansion, as CFI relied on 
their support.  They constituted significant shareholders of its parent company 
and also provided a large amount of UDT’s working capital - via loans and 
acceptances.
136 Furthermore, given that assisted companies would still require 
normal banking facilities, the banks held an effective veto over CFI’s clients – by 
threatening to withdraw facilities. Fears that the banks might sabotage the 
initiative are evident in a letter from Jarvie to Norman, which stated that CFI 
‘will not ask or expect anything from the joint stock banks beyond ordinary and 
justifiable banking facilities and a sympathetic co-operation.’
137 However, CFI 
did not receive such cooperation, as hinted at in a 1944 Bank of England 
memorandum on potential avenues for increasing the provision of finance to 
small businesses.  This noted that, should the Bank of England choose to boost 
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  50the financial resources of existing firms in this area, success would be blocked 
unless the banks would, ‘assure us that any existing company which has enjoyed 
facilities from the banks would continue to do so, notwithstanding the fact that 
the long-term concerns were technical competitors with the banks in their new 
venture.’
138
Given their  powerful position, Jarvie made it a rule not to advance money 
without the prior approval of the applicant’s bank.  However, this led to a 
substantial loss of business, as in many cases, after CFI had gone through the 
process of investigating a funding proposal which the firm’s bank had previously 
declined, the bank in question then stepped in and provided the finance, if vetting 
was positive.
139 This post-vetting ‘poaching’ both greatly curtailed the scope of 
CFI’s lending and inflated its administrative costs. By the end of June 1935 CFI 
had approved loans (at least in principle) totalling £1,272,421.  Of these, loans to 
the value of £649,900 had fallen through after being approved in principal, while 
a further £142,996 of firmly approved loans were still to be finally settled.  Of the 
remaining firmly approved loans (£479,525), only £228,349 had been actually 
lent, as £251,176 of business had been lost through other parties providing the 
finance (mainly the firms’ banks, which took business to the value of 
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  51£207,000).
140The financial statement from which these figures are derived does 
not give any details of potential business taken by the banks between the stages 
of provisional and final approval. However, in a meeting with Deputy Governor 
Catterns of the Bank of England on 26
th April 1944, Jarvie stated that 75 per cent 
of all potential investments ‘had been snapped up by banks who were supposed 
to be supporting him, and this after CFI had agreed to find the money’.
141  
The surviving archives provide no definitive proof regarding whether the 
banks were merely ‘cherry picking’ the best CFI business, by free-riding on its 
screening activities, or were pursuing a more deliberate policy to block their new 
competitor. However, from CFI’s perspective this made little difference, as the 
poaching prohibitively magnified its administrative costs; in June 1936 Jarvie had 
to report to his shareholders that these  had become disproportionate to the 
company’s revenue.
142 Thus CFI was prevented from taking any significant role 
in the small firm finance market or offering the sort of competition to the banks 
that might have made them modify their own lending policies. Jarvie’s 
experience was repeated after 1945, when the Bank of England pressured the Big 
Five into establishing the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC) 
as a new vehicle for bridging the Macmillan Gap. As the Corporation’s official 
history notes, some of the banks persistently tried to poach ICFC loans it had 
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Economic theory indicates that monopolists will reject a significant 
proportion of business that - though unprofitable from their monopoly 
perspective - would nevertheless have been successfully transacted in a 
competitive market. In the corporate lending market this involved firms which 
required long-term capital, or broader screening criteria to identify their 
credit-worthiness. These were generally not the sort of high-risk, high-reward 
technologically-based start-up companies that might attract wealthy financiers, 
but typically firms operating in established, competitive markets, that offered 
returns which were modest (but sufficient to secure finance if the banking 
system had also been competitive). The volume of such excluded business 
cannot be quantified even to a broad order of magnitude, for reasons outlined 
above. Yet, as banks’ lending criteria generally excluded loans for capital 
purposes, and capital expenditure by small and medium firms was thus often 
limited to internal resources, it can be expected to be substantial.  
While returns on such lending were not particularly high, they were 
sufficient to attract new entrants, as evidenced by the example of CFI. Yet the 
banks ability to withdraw overdraft facilities for working capital from firms 
                                                      
Banking and Finance Group”, unpublished typescript history, n.d., c. mid-1970s, 96. 
143 Coopey and Clarke, 3i, 36, 56-7. 
  53that used such instiutions for longer-term investment acted as an effective 
sanction over market entry. By selectively poaching business from the 
pioneering entrant, the banks prevented the emergence of any significant 
specialist medium-long term industrial lender of the type that emerged (with 
government support) in, for example, France and Germany. They thus not 
only protected their market share, but blocked the development of new loan 
screening methods that were more costly but (if the willingness of the banks to 
take CFI’s positively screened business is any indication) appeared to have 
been viewed as more effective than their own low-cost methods. In doing so 
they preserved their super-normal profits, at the expense of those smaller firms 
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